Somaliland

The Night SNM Fighters Came to Hargeisa

September 30, 2010   ·   1853761 Commentshttp%3A%2F%2Fsomalilandpress.com%2Fthe-night-snm-fighters-came-to-hargeisa-18537The+Night+SNM+Fighters+Came+to+Hargeisa+2010-10-01+00%3A00%3A08Mo+Guledhttp%3A%2F%2Fsomalilandpress.com%2F%3Fp%3D18537

With the knowledge that only the truth and not propaganda can establish credibility, the overarching aim of this writing is to record the events which took place as accurately and as impartially as possible. Any suggestion or correction would be welcomed and highly appreciated.

On Monday 30^th May 1988, in Hargeisa, among the civilian population there was pandemonium about the foreboding events whose long shadow was looming. Their anxiety was justified. The people were mindful of the dreadful events which took place in Burao only a few days earlier. In another report, we shall cover in detail the repulsive events which happened in Burao on 27^th to 30^th May 1988.

Throughout Monday, 30^th May 1988 Hargeisa was overflowing with people. Shoppers stocked up on all sorts of wares and foodstuff for uncertain times. In the center of Hargeisa where the local banks have been located many converged inside and outside the buildings to withdraw money from personal accounts. While in the shops a lot of grocery and merchandise changed hands, in the animal market next to the national theater it was deserted. There was not a soul to sell, buy, barter or broker sheep, camels or cattle.

As the clock ticked away on Monday, Hargeisa was awash with speculation triggered by dreadful events which took place in the far away red sanded city of Burao dominated much of the conversation. The people quaked from the war which was coming but little did they know how or when it would start. War would come sooner than expected. The residents’ worst fear was about to be confirmed. As dusk fell, tens of miles away, a convoy of SNM fighters was in the cover of darkness racing towards Hargeisa to match the gains of their comrades who overrun the garrison of the national army in Burao and who continued to occupy the city for weeks.

As night came, there was something strange about the place. There was the calm before the storm in Hargeisa. The city was dark, deserted and eerily quiet. Other than limited mobility between neighbors, movement was restricted. Even though deceptive SNM went a long way and succeeded to make its Burao adventure a surprise attack, it did not accomplish to make the government swallow its second deception which was to masquerade its next move. It wanted the government to believe that it did not intend to go beyond Burao. The government understood that Burco attack was a ruse and it will not be drawn to a red herring. Instead the government chose to await the SNM in Hargeisa and see if it would embark on its second adventure and drive to Hargeisa.

Military movement detected in the southern Hargeisa

In the early first half of the night, Hargeisa which is cut into two by a seasonal river, in the southern half of the city where government offices, agencies are garrisons are concentrated, there began in the dark a significant movement and mobility. These were the transfer of military personnel and hardware which gave the hint that the government was positioning itself for the imminent attacks. Unknown to the civilian population, the army was privy to new developments. As the night wore on the army reconnaissance plane reported the beam of light and bellowing dust of the SNM convoy tens of miles away racing towards the city which prompted the military to order Mig sorties against them.

Tuesday morning, 31^st May 1988, Hargeisa, Somalia

It was now approaching 1:00 am in the small hours of Tuesday 31^st May 1988 in Hargeisa when was heard the first roar of the Mig taking off from the upper hilltop grounds where the airport is located. For over 90 minutes half a dozen or so Mig would take to the air and land within an interval of 15 minutes. The Mig took turns to pounding the SNM convoy. In the war weary city where that night not many people went to bed amidst the roar of the Mig which was foretelling of the arrival of the war which the residents agonized over for days. It would be three hours to the count of dawn when the first patch SNM fighters would appear in the northern part of Hargeisa.

By now it was 2:30 am when in the small hours of Tuesday morning was heard the brief outburst of gunfire around the army garrison in the city which quickly spread towards Hargeisa club and the regional administrative headquarters. The skirmishes did not last long. Many of the SNM fighters were by now filtering into the city probably looking forward to making it to their homes first before taking on the government.

In the northern part of Hargeisa, the earth is covered in pebbles and all sizes of stone. Over an hour after the roar of the Mig had quietened, it was now approaching 3.00 am when in the northern part was heard the growing noise and crunching sound of footsteps on the pebbled ground. Unaware of the nature of the unfolding drama many from the neighborhood took to their compounds to get a glimpse of what was coming. Those who did not own a compound stood in the open space opposite their homes. To satisfy their curiosity the residents stared in the darkened horizon adjusting their glance to where the approaching sound was coming. As the residents stood in silence watching the unraveling incursion, they saw silhouettes of young men trekking from the west towards their area.

The mostly young men who were laden with small arms and ammunition were probably the ones who survived the air assault. Huddled together in small groups, the SNM fighters moved briskly in small numbers. They soon began dispersing in different direction in the northern part of the city where the homes of their families were situated. Some of the small groups went to the leafy and upmarket Gol-janno area while others went further to the elevated Daruuraha high ground and to further afield around Radio Hargeisa. Not surprisingly, some of the invading party crossed to the eastern neighborhoods towards new Hargeisa suburbs and around the national theater area where they had families.

In the northern part of Hargeisa some of the arrivals were from the hood. Two of them stood in front of the next home where they took turns to knock. That was when in the dark was heard the hasty knocks on the door followed by, “Hooyoy, guriga iga fur waa anigiiyee. “Hooyo, guriga iga fur.” (Mother, open the door, it is me.) Mother open the door for me.”) For years it was common knowledge that some of the young men from the neighboring families were away in Ethiopia having joined the movement.

The war in Hargeisa between SNM and the government

From the early morning of the 31^st May 1988, when SNM fighters milled into the northern parts of Hargeisa other than the early skirmishes the military authorities did not do much to spoil the homecoming of SNM fighters. Soon, the fighters who embedded themselves with different families in the northern and eastern parts of the city began to send messages to one another to decide on how to conduct their war of attrition with the government. Even though skirmishes were aplenty for the first few days the government authorities argued over how best to dislodge the fighters who embedded themselves among the civilian population.

In Hargeisa, soon before mid June 1988 there was a change of leadership in the military. General Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as Morgan who was the commander in charge of the 26^th sector army in Hargeisa was removed and sent back to Mogadishu. General Mohamed Ali Samater came in his place. The last thing General Mohamed Ali Samater, whom the government assigned to expel SNM fighters from Hargeisa wanted was to commit to bombing the areas where the fighters were located. Ali Samater came with the decision to isolate and cut the fighters off from supplies and logistics and suppress their mobility as well as expansion to other areas.

It was the SNM not General Samater who would influence how the war would be fought. SNM fighters were unquestionably motivated. They did not believe anything could stand in their way to take what they believed was their city. No wonder they were hasty. For the young men who drove to Hargeisa in the dark it was pure idealism which got the better of them. However, it was quite another for the SNM leadership. It was seduction of power which got the better of them.

In their haste to take Hargeisa, the SNM fighters deployed tactical mobile weaponry to wrestle the city from the hands of the government. In the battle to take Hargeisa SNM fighters introduced a modified version of mobile BM multiple rocket launchers which they brought with them. The “baby” BM dubbed rocket launchers which could be placed on any surface could fire up to eight shells at a time. No sooner did the SNM deploy its cherished rocket launchers than they began pounding government fortified positions and military camps such as Birjeex, the main army garrison situated in the south-western part of the city.

The shipment the Mig found and demolished

There was a “special” shipment of arms on the SNM convoy which the Derg in Ethiopia and its generals thought was crucial to capture Hargeisa. However, the shipment was intended to have had far reaching consequences not only for the battle of Hargeisa but for Somalia. This shipment was found and demolished by the Mig. As such there was nothing extra lethal about the shipment itself but the danger lurked at the part it was planned to play in the war and who it was intended for.

The shipment which was of special significance to Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and his generals was 10,000 North Korean made AK-47 machine guns and an endless supply of ammunition laden on a number of trucks in the convoy. The shipment was intended to be distributed to the civilian population in Hargeisa with the aim to ignite a civil war.

It was a callous and coldhearted move from the part of the SNM leadership to go along with a plan to arm the civilian population in Hargeisa in its bid to win its war with the government. The cruel and crafty Derg who saw the SNM as a pawn it had to use to destroy Somalia also must have felt the more Somali deaths the merrier.

Camps prepared in Ethiopia for refugees from the north

As the SNM convoy was ducking and diving from the Mig to make it to Hargeisa, in the eastern part of Ethiopia, the Derg was preparing refugee camps in Harshin, Cobole and Harta-Sheekha to settle residents of Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera who would flee the conflict it fuelled and fanned.¹ It was emblematic craftiness of the Derg to prepare the camps which would house hundreds of thousands of civilians who would flee from a conflict it ignited.

The immediate influx of the civilian population as expected by Mengistu Haile Mariam and his generals did not take place but it was only a matter of time. For weeks, the Somali government mulled over how best to dislodge and banish the fighters from the populated areas in Hargeisa.

The SNM attack on Burao

On 27^th May 1988 when the SNM attacked Burao the Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre was in Addis Ababa attending the twenty-fourth Ordinary Session of the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) in Ethiopia.² This was the first time the Somali President attended the OAU conference in Addis Ababa since 1976 when hostilities between the two countries began.

Part of the Somali President’s delegation was General Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as Morgan who went there to finalize the process of the agreement between the two countries. Somalia’s Defence Minister Adan Mohamed Nur Gabyow was also on an official tour to the UK and Italy. The Somali President and General Morgan took a flight and rushed back to Somalia on the following morning on 28^th May 1988.  On that same morning in Europe, General Adan Mohamed Nur at the end of his three days tour of Britain arrived in Italy where he remained for two days to fly back to Somalia.

The SNM fighters who attacked Burao, the capital of Togdheere region in a battle which lasted three days, over ran both the national army garrison and the police force garrison. The government took a conscious decision not to rush to the defence of Burao for the time being. The leadership did not wish to fall for the diversion tactics of the invasion. They got the message that Burao was the diversion and not the main prize. The SNM was not going to sit in Burao. It was unmistakably headed to Hargeisa. It was doing all that to disguise its higher valued second attack on Hargeisa. From the second day of the battle of Burao on 28^th May 1988 the government rushed preparations to defend Hargeisa. Burao, for a number of weeks remained in the hands of the SNM before the arrival of reinforcements and a new general who took over the new command.

Factors which aided SNM to capture Burao

There were a number of factors which aided SNM gains in Burao. The primary factor which aided the SNM to capture Burao was the unexpected nature of the attacks. Nobody in their wildest imagination thought they will attack their own homes and cities. At least before 1988 no group or movement ever embarked on a gamble as wild as attacking a government held city. In 1988, in its seventh year after its formation the SNM could not manage to capture a single village let alone the countryside before embarking to attack cities.

Another factor concerns the unmistakable role of Ethiopia in the orchestration of the attacks. On 4^th April 1988 when the two countries signed an agreement, the last thing Somalia expected was an attack mounted from Ethiopia. From the start the peace agreement was a treacherous deal fraught with danger. Atypical to Mengistu Haile Mariam’s ruthlessness, the callousness of the attacks was too obvious. They were timed and carried out at a time when the Defence Minister of the country was away on a tour and the Somali President accompanied by the military commander of the northern regions were both in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Another important factor which aided the SNM to capture Burao was its fighters’ knowledge of their region. The fighters who hailed from Togdheer knew very well the terrain of their region. Many of fighters too were former national army officers and servicemen who were familiar with the garrison and the city. From 27^th to 30^th May 1988 there were appalling events which took place in Burao which were indulged by the fighters. Over twenty years on since the attack on Burao many SNM veterans remain ashamed of the bad stuff which went on after their capture of Burao and many dreadful things carried out during the second SNM war of “liberation” in 1991.

The end of the war in Hargeisa

In Hargeisa, in mid June 1988 when the SNM bombardment and shelling intensified it forced the hand of the military authorities headed by General Mohamed Ali Samater. The authorities had to abandon any hope it had to isolate and cut off the SNM fighters. The war continued for few more weeks. However, in its fifth week, the fighters were eventually dislodged from the city. They did not go far. They moved to the outskirts where they began to regroup around Geed Deeble, an area known for its source of the water supply of Hargeisa.³ Undaunted SNM fighters dug in around Geed Deeble where they conducted fiercely fought battles which continued for over a month after which they got out from their positions and retreated back to Ethiopia to fight another day.

The end of the 1988 SNM war in Burao

In Burao too where they staged fiercely fought battles, SNM fighters were eventually dislodged from the city. On 15^th August 1988 in a concerted effort the fighters who attacked Burao and Hargeisa left the cities and the northern territory altogether. They went back to Ethiopia to fight another day.⁴ In subsequent installments we shall visit in detail other dimensions of the events which took place in both the 1988 war and the second SNM war in 1991 which saw the declaration of the secession of the north from the rest of Somalia.⁵

Who fights for cities without people or buildings left standing?

No armed movement fights for flattened and derelict cities which its civilian population were killed or crippled. Having routed the “mighty” army of the Derg, in order to save its civilian population, avoid property damage and preserve its capital, it took the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) months of careful planning and preparation to enter Asmara. The EPLF which for decades fought to liberate its territory from Ethiopia saw the jewel of its fight was Asmara which should remain intact and undamaged.

In a similar parallel struggle, having routed the Derg army the TPLF (Tigray peoples Liberation Front) waited on the outskirts of Addis Ababa not to avoid its destruction. It took the TPLF weeks with no one to challenge their advance, agonizing over how best to enter Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The TPLF was aware that its struggle would have amounted to zero had they put ambition ahead of country. What was the SNM thinking attacking cities in the north packed with its own people? This is something you will never hear. Self-examination is one of the qualities which we lack as people. It is always someone else to blame.

Assessment of Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo and his leadership

Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, who on 2^nd July 2010 has been elected the President of “Somaliland”, has capabilities which helped transform the SNM from a tribal militia to a fighting machine. After all, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo was for a long time, the Minister of Planning in the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre. But, like every human, the great planner Silanyo too has flaws. In a 21^st century world, tribal emotion could get the better of him. Anyone who divides his nation will also divide his clan. Anyone whose ambition is based on love of self ahead of country will make little or no difference for the people or the country.

What leadership would make its cities a battle ground, use its civilian population as human shield and send its young people to harms way and to the furnace? No leadership should ask its able men and young people to attack and hold onto cities held by a government before first securing the villages and the surrounding territories. Without an inch of territory in its hands simply rushing from locations in Ethiopia to attack government held cities was departing from one’s marbles.

The SNM had ardent fund raisers

The SNM had by far the most committed passionate supporters and fund raisers. There were a large business and other expatriate community who dug deeper into their pockets and contributed without question to the funding of the campaigns of the SNM including the 1984 hijack of a Somali Airlines flight from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa. The SNM too had to its credit many wealthy persons whose checkbooks were readily available for the cause.

There was a time when in the late 1980s one of the Boeing planes of the Somali Airlines was ferrying troops and artillery shells from Mogadishu to Hargeisa. It was discussed by the SNM leadership and its fund raisers how to bring down the plane in one of its voyages. A large amount of US dollars were pledged and made available to buy a stinger missile.⁶ One of the highest contributors of this particular mission was Ibrahim Dheere who imported Rothmans cigarettes in Djibouti. Unfortunately, the mission to buy a stinger missile was not successful but yet it showed how committed to the cause were its supporters.

Deception was part of war

The use of the art of deception is not uncommon by movements who had to face mightier enemies and the SNM was not exception. By any standard the SNM was cunning and deceptive. That may be the reason why they never hinted their intention to break away from the rest of their country. In its 1988 Burao campaign secrecy and deception was an elaborate part of the plan to win the battle. The 24 hours before its Burao attack on 27^th May 1988 the SNM deliberately flooded Togdheer with the largest import of qat from Ethiopia which was sold at a give away price to the reach of everyone in the region. The aim was to sit and numb the population with the mild drug in order to limit their mobility from its activities and the impact of its impending attack.

The SNM may have been deceptive but it had more than its match in cunning the Derg government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. In SNM, the Derg saw a partner willing to do its bidding to wage its proxy war against Somalia and they have been mercilessly used by a crafty enemy whose relentless aim was all along to destroy Somalia. The SNM judgment was clouded to see Mengistu for who he was (not their friend but the enemy of the existence of their nation), because of a convergence of the interest of the SNM and the Derg to defeat of the Somali government in Mogadishu.

Except its Derg benefactors nobody knew the intention of the SNM to attack Burao and Hargeisa. The SNM succeed to make its Burao attack a surprise. But the SNM did harbor a bigger ambition: to attack Hargeisa. The aim of the Burao attack was to divert the government’s attention and draw its resources to Burao to position and execute its attack on Hargeisa. The government got the message. It did not swallow this part of SNM deception. It refused to be drawn to Burao. Behind the SNM laid the collaboration of the Derg, masters of deception. The government instantaneously became aware that it was Hargeisa where the SNM was headed. It did not take long for the SNM to show its hand. After the SNM attacked Hargeisa for a few weeks the government stayed away from Burco. Reinforcements, logistics and a new command were prepared to go to Burco.

By embedding its fighters in the civilian population in Hargeisa, the SNM played a reckless deception which put the government in a difficult position of damn-if-you-do and damn-if-you don’t. The SNM could be accused that it did not care much for the civilian population. The plausible scenario was the SNM which always demanded more manpower wanted to benefit from the flight of the civilian population from their homes in the north to camps in eastern Ethiopia where it can secure endless supply of recruits. Was that the aim?

Prelude to the 1988 war in northern Somalia

On 15^th March 1978, the last unit of the Somali national army pulled out of Somali inhabited territories in Ethiopia which Somalia had captured. After many months of pitched battles, Somalia could not ignore the threat to its own security to continue the war with a coalition force which included not only the Ethiopian army but battalions of military personnel and officers from the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Yemen who rushed to the aid of communist Ethiopia.⁷

Between the end of 1976 to February 1978, Somalia may have succeeded to capture most of the territories it had laid claim before the Soviet Union embarked on a massive sea and airlift of arms worth US $6.6 billion and the arrival of the coalition forces. But the war would prove a God-sent opportunity for the Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam to consolidate his grip on power.⁸ On the other hand the debacle was to bring economic, social and security upheavals for Somalia. It led to the attempted coup by a group of military officers on 9^th April 1979 who failed to overthrow President Mohamed Siad Barre. ⁹

When the main conflict was ended on 15^th March 1978 the two countries drifted to a state of unmitigated war in which the air force of the Derg government of Mengistu Haile Mariam continued to bombard Somalia. Hargeisa and Borama in particular were constantly targeted where civilians and school children lost their lives. One of the worst bombardments was on 30^th January 1984 when fighter jets of the Ethiopian air force bombed a school in Borama. On that ominous day 37 children lost their lives and many more were wounded and maimed.¹⁰ Ever since the 1978 war, Somalia and Ethiopia continued to remain at logger heads until in April 1988 when a treacherous peace agreement favoring Ethiopia was signed by Somalia at the request of the Derg.

Between 1978 -1988 Somalia and Ethiopia were actively engaged to support, fund and arm opposition movements against one another. The Somali government headed by President Mohamed Siad Barre used to arm liberation fronts from Eritrea, Tigray and Oromo. The Derg government of President Mengistu Haile Mariam also took to the funding and arming of opposition movements against Somalia which one after another went to operate from bases within Ethiopia. The SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front)¹¹ drawn mainly from the central regions of Somalia was the first to locate itself and its struggle in Ethiopia followed in the early 1980s by SNM (Somali National Movement)¹² drawn exclusively from Northern Somalis and then in 1989 USC (United Somali Congress) drawn from the South began operating from within Ethiopia. ¹³

Precursor events before the 1988 war in the north

Commenting on the 1977-1978 conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the writer Saleh AA Younis sums up to say, “If recently declassified documents from the Soviet Bloc are to be believed, there was no Somalia-Ethiopia conflict in 1977.  Truly, it was Somalia vs. Cuba/USSR….It was only after the Soviet bloc, specifically Cuba had, in the words of Castro, decided on “massive intervention” that the tides turned. ¹⁴

After the end of the 1977-1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, the two nations continued on warring footing. There was no restoration of relation, until in 1987 when Mengistu Haile Mariam made a number of overtures towards establishing relations with Somalia. One of the underlying reasons of the change of heart of the Derg was the severity of the beatings the regime was taking in the hands of the fronts in Eritrea and Tigray.

In mid 1987 the leader of Somalia Mohamed Siad Barre and the leader of Ethiopia Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti. This brief encounter did not yield much in the form of agreement. When in the early 1988 in the northern fronts, the Derg army began taking terrible losses at the hands of the EPLF (The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front) and the TPLF (The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front) jittery set in the minds of the rulers in Ethiopia. The Derg had to do something about the impending defeat of its army and the collapse of its regime.

On 19^th March 1988, Mohamed Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti to discuss ways of reducing tension between the two countries. ¹⁵ Although little was accomplished, the two agreed to hold further talks. On 3^rd April 1988, the Derg sent its Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mogadishu. On 4^th April 1988, a peace agreement between the two countries was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Berhanu Bayeh and Ahmad Mohamud Farah, the Second Vice-President of Somalia. Part of the joint communiqué was to restore diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners of war, start mutual withdrawal of troops from the border area, and end subversive activities and hostile propaganda against one another. ¹⁶ As it transpired, the Derg was only after one aim. Its aim was to move thousands of troops tied down in the eastern regions in Ethiopia facing Somalia to the northern fronts against the EPLF in Eritrea and the TPLF in Tigray where they were needed urgently.

Somalia’s long standing Foreign Minister Abdirahman Jama Barre was vehemently against the “peace” deal with the Derg government in Ethiopia. Abdirahman Jama who is known for his patriotism felt the deal was treacherous and ill-conceived. To him it was similar to a pact with the devil. President Mohamed Siad Barre saw differently. The Somali President felt it was time to build peace with Ethiopia. In order to get Abdirahman Jama Barre out of the way he was moved from his Foreign Affairs Ministry portfolio to become the Minister of Finance. After the SNM attacks on Burao and Hargeisa which were orchestrated with the approval and support of the Derg which signed a “peace” agreement with Somalia, Abdirahman Jama was vindicated. He was proven right rejecting the treacherous “peace” deal.

Summation of the 1988 SNM war in the north

Under its long time chairman Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo (the incumbent President of “Somaliland”), the SNM was exceptionally good at planning and organization. However, the 1988 SNM attacks on Burao and Hargeisa may have been daring but equally reckless, suicidal and without a care in the world for the able men and the young lives who were asked to attack and hold onto government held cities.

The SNM had in its ranks former national military officers and civil servants. The SNM was by far the most organized movement and by miles ahead of all fronts against the government. But the 1988 SNM attacks of Hargeisa and Burao were disastrous for its movement, the cities attacked and the civilian population. Indeed, the Derg saw it had nothing to lose but everything to gain to support the SNM in its raid of government held cities. The Derg saw in its interest to support the attacks as long as what was destroyed were Somali cities and the blood spilled on both sides was Somali blood.

Idealism is one thing but quite another to attack and hold onto government held cities. Probably, the easiest part of the SNM incursion was its daring attacks. However, historians shall record that the 1988 SNM attacks on Hargeisa and Burao were ill-judged and should not have been carried out in the first place.

There was something strange about the attacks on Burao and Hargeisa

The SNM must have known that Ethiopia was not going to come to their aid let alone to their rescue. Their deal with the Derg was to throw them into the ocean wishing to swim their way out of the situation. The deal was actually to give them everything they needed for the attacks. They should have known that the Derg was not an honest host who was not concerned about them or their wellbeing.

What did the SNM expect attacking Burao and Hargeisa? Did they expect to be rewarded for their action? This is in a different way similar to why Bin Laden attacked the Twin Towers. Bin Laden was under the false belief that the day after his Twin Towers attacks, the US will send him a jet and make him the King of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden drew a wrong message and lesson from the 1993 US intervention in Somalia. Like everybody else he watched on television how the US first hunted down General Mohamed Farah Aideed after his militia slaughtered 24 UN peace keepers. Later he also saw how after the killing 18 US servicemen and dragging one of the bodies on the street, Aideed was welcomed out of his hiding and later taken on a State Department jet to attend a peace conference in Addis Ababa. Bin laden was mesmerized by Aideed and what happened in Somalia. What Bin Laden wanted all along was to replace the monarchy in his home country and become the head of Saudi Arabia.

Summation of the armed movements against Somalia

Many armed movements have fought in many countries including Ethiopia itself with the aim to bring political change or for self-determination. Many movements such as the EPLF and TPLF in their struggle were principled and patriotic.

The 1980s armed movements against the government in Somalia were invariably tribal with the aim to serve personal and clan ambitions rather than nation. Is it not the case that the net result of the struggle of the likes of the SSDF, SNM and USC accomplished was anything other than the destruction of Somalia: their own homeland? In an interview to the Somali Service of the BBC, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the former TFG President who resides in Yemen and who was the founder of the first armed opposition against Somalia “SSDF” admitted that he wouldn’t have done what he did had he known what he knows today. ¹⁷

General Mohamed Ali Samater: A Somali Hero of the Highest Order!

In almost every film story there is a hero and a villain. In the twisted society Somalia has become there are those who wish to pass anyone who serves their home as a villain and anyone who goes to aid their nation’s sworn enemy as a hero. There is no shame in coming to the defence of your nation. In this story there is a hero and a mercilessly heartless villain who throughout his years as the leader of Ethiopia remained the unflinching and remorseless enemy of Somalia.

By any means, in this story, the SNM is not the enemy. It is the misjudgment of a few opportunists hoodwinked by their ambition which make possible the success of our enemy to make Somalis see one another enemy. The SNM were able, organized and motivated but misguided. They were disgruntled Somalis who have become a pawn at the behest of their benefactor master Mengistu Haile Mariam who in exchange of his support of their cause was to use them in his cherished goal to see the total destruction of Somalia.

The villain in this story is Mengistu Haile Mariam, the former leader of Ethiopia and his vanquished regime which fuelled and fanned the 1988 SNM attacks on northern Somalia. Mengistu Haile Mariam was sick with his enmity of Somalia. He never hid his wish to destroy Somalia.

In 1988 Major-General Mohamed Ali Samater who was the most senior military officer in Somalia after the President was the man the government assigned to repel the SNM from the north. In doing so General Samater is not a villain but a hero who had to do what every patriotic general was trained for. In retirement and in his advanced years in America, Mohamed Ali Samater has nothing to be ashamed of but everything to be proud of.

It is disheartening that Mohamed Ali Samater, a former vice president of Somalia has been, in his twilight years, subjected to relentless harassment and heckles in the United States where he has made a home. Out of respect of the Somali people, the people and government of the United States should protect Mohamed Ali Samater from undeserved harassment.

Mohamed Ali Samater is a man who has always been loyal to his nation and country. It contravenes the law of any decent society to persecute any man for doing what every general is trained to do: to defend his country from its enemies. We shall visit in detail about the role and heroism of Mohamed Ali Samater in another installment in the near future.

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¹According to eye witnesses who were resettled in the Somali region in Ethiopia
^{2 http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/XHOGASSEMBLY1988.PDF}

³The water supply of Hargeisa was built by China

⁴Former SNM fighters

⁵http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2010/August/Abdulkadir_Mohamoud/11_Why_Somaliland_is_not_Kosovo.html

⁶ SNM veteran member

⁷ Wikipedia

^{8 http://www.mongabay.com/history/ethiopia/ethiopia-the_derg,_the_soviet_union,_and_the_communist_world.html}

^{9 http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/somalia/profiles.php}

^{10 http://harowo.com/2008/01/21/the-day-i-lost-my-friend/}

¹¹ The SSDF had its supporters drawn from the central regions

¹² The SNM drew its support entirely from the northern Somalia

¹³ The USC drew support from the people in southern Somalia.

^{14 http://www.denden.com/Conflict/newscom/ethiopian_myth.html}

¹⁵ Wikipedia

¹⁶ Somali government officials

¹⁷http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/somalia/profiles.php

By

Abdulkadir Mohamoud

am5430064@gmail.com

This writing is based on eye witness accounts, analysis and interviews of members of the general public, civil servants, former SNM members and former members of Somalia’s national army.

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Views expressed in the opinion articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Somalilandpress editorial.

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By Mo Guled

Tags: Ethiopian army, SNM Fighters, Somaliland, SSDF